Abstract
AbstractWe study the conflict between financial interests and prosocial behavior in a new variant of a three‐person dictator game, which we refer to as “social exclusion game.” In this game, one person, the dictator, decides whether all three players (the dictator and two receivers) receive the fair outcome (equal payoffs) or an unfair outcome, which excludes one of the receivers and raises the dictator's payoff. We elicit the minimal payment necessary to induce the dictator to exclude the third person and investigate how this is influenced by peer information and the Big Five personality factor agreeableness. The data support our hypotheses.
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