Abstract

ABSTRACTThe pursuit of better performance by the local government can influence the investment decision-making related to port expansion. This paper compares the ceilings at which the port enterprise and the local government would stop making investments. To achieve this, the benefits to the port enterprise and the local government are measured over a given time period. An empirical study investigating how a port would respond if a rival port uses a type of capacity investment strategy is conducted for two major ports in Liaoning. The time at which the local government and the port enterprise would stop making investments and the final equilibrium are developed using the data from 2010. From the empirical results, it was found that investment in port capacity contributes greatly to the local government’s performance. Meanwhile, different investment ceilings are discovered for the port enterprise and the local government. This research is meaningful for discussing the institutional relationship between the local government and the port enterprise in China’s current decentralized port governance system.This paper is a revised and expanded version of a paper entitled ‘Port expansion mechanism in the context of political achievement of local government: a special phenomenon in China’ presented at International Association of Maritime Economists 2012 Taipei Conference during 5th September –8th September.

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