Abstract
In the context of green port construction, the interaction mechanism between local government and port enterprises in the port emission reduction problem is studied. A two-party evolutionary game model with the introduction of prospect theory is constructed and sensitivity analysis of key parameters is carried out. The results show that the initial probability affects the time for the system to reach stability; that different carbon tax regimes have less influence on local governments and significant influence on port enterprises; that the high cost of port enterprises has a decisive influence on the strategy choice of port enterprises; that the reputation loss of local governments has a decisive influence on the strategy choice of governments; that the higher the probability of ENGO discovery is, the faster the system reaches stability; and that the loss aversion coefficient and risk attitude influence the strategy choice of game parties.
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