Inequality and Radical Land Reform: Some Notes from West Bengal

Abstract

THIS ESSAY DISCUSSES some aspects of the problem of land reform in conditions of great inequality almost total in scope, encompassing economic, social, ritual, coercive and political spheres, such as those prevailing in the relations between poorer peasants and landlords in West Bengal. A turbulent issue in West Bangal politics is the survival of bargadar (sharecroppers) as bargadar. The issue, in the first place, is a direct consequence of attempts to achieve radical land reform in an unequal society. The West Bengal Land Reform (Amendment) Act of 1970 was radical enough to threaten the interests of the landlords but wholly ineffectual in the execution, thereby exposing the bargadar to fierce retaliation by the landlords. I examine the implementation and consequences of the Act, and argue, first, that a reduction in political inequality is an indispensable precondition for such reform to be effective, and second, that in certain circumstances radical reform can end up as a half measure and a detriment to the interests of the peasants, in this case the bargadar. The concept of land reform includes at least three different sectors in agrarian structure: land tenure (ownership or title to land); pattern of cultivation (e.g., market/subsistence); and terms of holding and scale of operation (e.g., large scale/small scale, fixed share/fixed amount as rent).' The Act of 1970, together with its later amendments, sought to modify both tenure and the terms of tenancy. The power to evict a