Indonesia: Now or Never

Abstract

FROM a military point of view the Indonesian rebellion which began in February seems to be over. True, most of the lead ers of the Revolutionary Republic are still at large, hiding in the jungle or in exile. Guerrilla warfare may continue for some time. There may even be sporadic air raids by rebel-hired planes. But effective rebel resistance to the regular armed forces broke down almost as soon as the Djakarta government decided to fight. It is not likely to reappear now. Meanwhile the basic economic and political problems that gave rise to the rebellion are more serious than ever, and the resort to force has aggravated the underlying grievances of the people in the outer islands against the central government. The govern ment leaders now face the delicate and difficult task of unifying the country, finding a way to provide stable government, and developing the economy in a manner satisfactory to all major groups. If they succeed within the next year, Indonesia can hold her elections in the fall of 1959 with every hope of moving towards mature democracy. If they fail, they will probably prove to have lost Indonesia her last chance to choose a non-Communist path of economic and political development. The United States Government and American enterprises in Indonesia steadfastly refused to support the rebels despite their anti-Communist and pro-Western complexion. Perhaps they as sessed the chances for the success of the rebels more accurately than these did themselves; perhaps they feared that intervention would create another Spain, a battleground for the major Pow ers and thus the beginning of World War III; perhaps they felt simply that to support the legally constituted government was the right thing to do, even if many friends were on the other side. Whatever the reason, the policy will have proven wise in the long run if the West follows through by helping the Indonesian Gov ernment to eradicate the causes of the rebellion and to get on the road to becoming a unified nation with a stable and progressive economy. Why did the revolution fail? How could the revolutionary lead ers, men of high caliber and with wide and deep knowledge of Indonesian politics, make such disastrous errors of judgment?