Indispensable Even When Unreliable

Abstract

In their recently published memoirs, former Vice-President Dick Cheney and former National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice wrote the following:Turkey had stood with us in Korea and, as a NATO member, been an invaluable ally during the Cold War.... But by 2002 a worrisome change was under way, and my visit with Turkish leaders, though cordial, was far different from the one I had made in 1990, when we were seeking allies to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait...In November 2002 the Islamist AKP party would win a majority in the parliament, making Recep Erdogan, leader of the party, prime minister the following March. The newly elected parliament would reject our request to deploy the U.S. Army's 4th Infantry Division through Turkey....In general, I think we failed to understand the magnitude of the shift that was taking place in Turkey. The significance of an Islamist government taking power in one of America's most important NATO allies was in a sense obscured because of all the other challenges we faced.Today, appears to be in the middle of a dangerous transition from a key NATO ally to an Islamist-governed nation developing close ties with countries like Iran and Syria at the expense of its relations with the United States and Israel.1 The freedom agenda as we knew would be the work of generations.Nevertheless, in the short term, it was important to have some concrete manifestation of the possibility of its success. was a stable country that, in its transition, was providing evidence that democracy and Islam could exist side by side.2 In a recent article, Caban Kardac argues against Ian Lessees stance that Turkey's current foreign policy represents a third wave of strategic orientation, defined by the quest to find strategic assurance in rehabilitating traditional ties and strategic relationships with western allies, particularly the United States.3 According to Kardac, uncertain of the reliability of the United States, cognizant of Washington's diminishing capabilities, and in need of regional allies as the US begins its retrenchment phase, Turkey will not trade its strategic autonomy for reassurance and deterrence. Be prepared to see some of the same old wine in a new bottle: policy convergence with the West accompanied by desire for autonomous action and rhetorical criticism of the West.4Here you have all the codes you need to decipher Turkish foreign policy and particularly its relations with the United States. You have as the ingrate Islamically oriented country that turns its back on the west; then you have the of great ambitions, ambitions so great that it may overreach its capacity in this moment of enthusiasm or hubris; and finally you have a that takes advantage of the structural shifts in international relations, puts its own vision to work, defines its environment, and seeks to maintain its room for maneuver.These quotes summarize the conflicting views of many in the United States concerning Turkey's government and its foreign policy. The recent downgrading of diplomatic relations with Israel, accompanied by acrimonious language on the part of the authorities, certainly reinforced such views. is seen by some as turning its back on the west, and the ruling Justice and Development party (AKP) is deemed to be Islamizing Turkey's foreign policy. Such views are propagated incessantly and disregard the actual record. That has just agreed to host the radar for NATO's Iran-aimed missile shield system, and that it works closely with the Obama administration on Iraq, Syria, and the broader Middle East, are both easily ignored.Outwardly, the relations between the US and appeared to be on the rocks in the wake of the 2003 Iraq resolution to which Cheney alludes. The US felt betrayed by its long-standing ally. Turkey, on the other hand, felt that Washington totally disregarded the vital interests and well-founded concerns of Ankara when it undertook its ill-fated Iraq adventure. …