Abstract

An evolutionary model of European football was applied to analyze a two-stage indirect evolution game in which teams choose their utility function in the first stage, and their optimal talent investments in the second stage. Given the second-stage optimal aggregate-taking strategy (ATS) of talent investment, it was shown that teams may choose a mix of profit or win maximization as their objective, where the former is of considerably higher relevance with linear weights for profits, and is more successful in the utility function. With linear weights for profit and win maximization, maximizing profits is the only evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of teams. The results change if quadratic weights for profits and wins are employed. With increasing talent productivity, win maximization dominates in the static and in the dynamic versions of the model. As a consequence, it is an open question whether the commercialization of football (and other sports) leagues will lead to more profit or win maximization.

Highlights

  • The aim of this paper and its contribution to the literature is the analysis of whether utility maximization or profit maximization is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in European football if teams choose whether to maximize utility or profit

  • It seems to be a generally accepted view in sports economics that U.S American sports leagues are characterized by profit maximization, whereas utility maximization, defined as maximization of the teams’ winning percentages, is the main objective of teams in European football leagues [5,6,7,8,9]

  • The indirect evolution approach [22,23] proposes the following dynamics: preferences motivate behavior, and behavior leads to success, success itself may be the key driver of the development and change of preferences via an evolutionary feedback process

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Summary

Introduction

The aim of this paper and its contribution to the literature is the analysis of whether utility (or win) maximization or profit maximization is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in European football ( known as soccer) if teams choose whether to maximize utility or profit. The concept of indirect evolution [22,23] was applied to analyze the choice of the clubs’ goals in the first stage of the game This concept is not part of ordinary evolutionary game theory, as the latter assesses strategies according to their success with respect to fitness, and does not directly take account of the motivation of agents The indirect evolution approach [22,23] proposes the following dynamics: preferences motivate behavior, and behavior leads to success, success itself may be the key driver of the development and change of preferences via an evolutionary feedback process

Talent Investment
Choosing Goals
Preference Dynamics in a Football League
Discussion
Conclusions

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