India in Afghanistan

Abstract

Ever since the declaration of the ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan in 2001, New Delhi has heavily invested in humanitarian assistance, development projects and nation-building activities in that country with a view to cultivate a mutually beneficial relationship with Kabul and thereby enhance its own regional security. However, its reliance on the ‘soft power’ approach made it a ‘secondary player’ in Afghanistan; its views and concerns were not adequately taken into account by the international community while reaching crucial decisions regarding the endgame in Afghanistan—phasing out of international forces and handing over the charge to the Afghan National Army; and the United States seemed more inclined to rely on Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) to engage the Taliban leadership in the ensuing political process. This quite expectedly generated domestic resentment in India as well as calls for adoption of a more robust approach to protect its interests in Afghanistan. This article explores the new policy course New Delhi has embarked on—which included conclusion of a comprehensive security agreement with Kabul and policy coordination with Russia and Iran—and also evaluates the policy options available to India in post-2014 Afghanistan.