Abstract

Using dictator game experiments, the authors investigate the effect on donation of the dictator and/or recipient working prior to the dictator donating. We focus on two issues that previous studies have not considered. First, we examine the impact on donating behavior of a difference in endowment caused by the dictator's work performance. Second, we explore donation behavior when the recipient's work does not yield income or affect the dictator's endowment, but the recipient's work performance is made known to the dictator. Experimental results indicate that donating behavior is affected not only by the dictator working, but also by the recipient working. In addition, donating behavior is affected by income level, as determined by the dictator's work performance, and is influenced by the recipient's work performance, two findings not previously reported.

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