Abstract
In this paper I question the uniformity assumptions central to the contractarian interpretations of justice. As examples, homogeneity assumptions in Kant, Rawls, and Binmore’s views on justice are examined and the applicability of their postulations is questioned. It is shown that contractarian principles of justice are only plausible in small groups of highly correlated and similarly minded members. Bargaining models for the original position are studied which again need to assume homogeneity of opinion to be conclusive. In contrast, it is possible to replace the top-down contractarian methodology with a bottom-up game theoretical approach. The adoption of evolutionarily stable strategies and the transition from evolutionarily stable strategies to conventions are detailed. I study the connection of altruism and spite through the insider-outsider duality. It is shown that this duality is a necessary component in the analysis of justice in heterogenous societies. Considering the effects of inclusion-exclusion on contractarian doctrines, the possibility of a global theory of justice based on evolutionary methods is proposed.
Published Version
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