Abstract
AbstractConflict across African states has often been linked to ethnic-based biases in government, and exclusive policies. However, the domestic politics of developing states, and the elites who contest for power therein, have often been overlooked when explaining the patterns and risk of disorder and violence. We consider how African leaders practice politics in whom to represent, and at what level. These choices have consequences as how regimes accommodate political elites creates different competitive conditions which, in turn, create incentives and opportunities for political violence. Using a dataset on cabinet appointments over twenty years, we find that high levels of elite political inclusion and mal-apportionment in positions is consistently associated with increases in non-state violence. Power distribution levels among those groups included in senior positions account for more political violence than that which stems from exclusive politics.
Highlights
Recent conflict research has explained the rise and persistence of civil wars through exclusive and biased political settlements and institutional arrangements
How does the composition of an inclusive government influence conflict? We address how levels and variants of political representation at senior levels of government are associated with the form and occurrence of political violence
We develop a compelling explanation for increased political violence through competitive clientelism among group representatives and senior elites
Summary
Recent conflict research has explained the rise and persistence of civil wars through exclusive and biased political settlements and institutional arrangements. These same institutions and elites have served to promote and propagate internal regime practices that determine and secure appointments, rents, and access to power These practices have increased levels of ‘competitive clientelism’ at the senior scales of government, where groups and their elite representatives use political violence against the state and each other to secure access to authority, positions, and proximity to the leader. In these inclusive and competitive regimes, levels of absolute representation and levels of political exclusion are not closely related to conflict rates. Access to positions is so crucial that included elites are wary of jeopardising their privileged position and rarely push for political reform, and even opposition politicians frequently accept offers for inclusion from the regime.
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