In Defense of Realism and Selectivism from Lyons’s Objections

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Lyons (in: Humphreys (ed) The Oxford handbook of philosophy of science, Oxford University Press, New York, pp 564–584, 2016; Synthese 194(9): 3203–3219, 2017; Spontaneous Gener J Hist Philos Sci 9(1): 146–150, 2018) formulates Laudan’s (Philos Sci 48(1): 19–49, 1981) historical objection to scientific realism as a modus tollens. I present a better formulation of Laudan’s objection, and then argue that Lyons’s formulation is supererogatory. Lyons rejects scientific realism (Putnam, Mathematics, matter and method: philosophical papers volume I, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975) on the grounds that some successful past theories were (completely) false. I reply that scientific realism is not the categorical hypothesis that all successful scientific theories are (approximately) true, but rather the statistical hypothesis that most successful scientific theories are (approximately) true. Lyons rejects selectivism (Kitcher, The advancement of science: science without legend, objectivity without illusion, Oxford University Press, New York, 1993; Psillos, Scientific realism: how science tracks truth, Routledge, New York, 1999) on the grounds that some working assumptions were (completely) false in the history of science. I reply that selectivists would say not that all working assumptions are (approximately) true, but rather that most working assumptions are (approximately) true.