In Defense of Aristotelian Actualism

Abstract

ionism, his term for Lewis's linguistic ersatzism, is mistaken. Van Inwagen writes: Aristotelian Actualism I 63 Lewis argues that Linguistic Abstractionism is defective because it cannot coherently formulate the thesis that the actual world is impoverished in a way in which it probably is impoverished. If Linguistic Abstractionism is right, then all possible uninstantiated properties are ones that would be instantiated if objects of types that actually exist were sufficiently numerous and properly arranged.25 Perhaps this is true for Linguistic Abstractionism as defined by van Inwagen, but it is not true for Aristotelian actualism (understood in a certain way). It is certainly possible that there are basic alien objects with basic alien properties. Thus, it is possible that there are properties that are not properties of any object composed of actual objects. So it is certainly coherent to think that the actual world is impoverished in this way. Aristotelian actualism holds that there might have been properties distinct from any actual property just as there might have been objects distinct from any actual object. In fact, this is one difference between Aristotelian actualism and other forms of actualism such as the form that Plantinga adopts and that van Inwagen seems to agree with. On Plantinga's view this world cannot be impoverished with respect to properties-indeed, no world can. Of course, to say that it is possible that there is property distinct from any actual property is not to say there exists a possible property distinct from any actual property anymore than to say that it is possible that there is a basic object distinct from any actual basic object is to say there is a possible basic object distinct from any actual object. This distinction is just the difference between actualism and possibilism (as it applies to objects or properties). It should be pointed out that the example that van Inwagen presents is one that seems to involve possible properties. He says: Consider some property possessed in our world only by quarks: having an R-G color-charge of -112, say. This is a possible property, since it is instantiated in some wor1d:the actual one. But it is not instantiated in any world that contains only things composed of things of kinds that exist in the simple world we have imagined. 26 Assuming that having an R-G color-charge of -112 is a basic property, Van Inwagen's point is that this particular property (call it 'R') is clearly a possible property since it is an actual property. However, had a world without quarks been actual, then on Aristotelian actualism, there would be no such property and hence it would not even be possible. Since R clearly is a possible property, Aristotelian actualism must be defective. Notice that the same sort of argument can be made with respect to Socrates. Socrates is clearly a possible object since he is an actual object. Had a world without Socrates been actual, there would be no Socrates, and hence Socrates