Improving Indo-Pakistan relations: international relations theory, nuclear deterrence and possibilities for economic cooperation

Abstract

The India–Pakistan relationship, after the overt nuclearisation in May 1998, the Kargil Conflict of 1999, the border mobilisation of 2002 and the continuing insurgency in Kashmir, remains tense. This paper explores the possibility of economic cooperation—including both trade and common infrastructure projects—taking place and spilling over into security cooperation. It analyses why past economic cooperation was so minimal, and why the only major agreement, that on the Indus basin waters, did not lead to deeper economic or security cooperation. Viewing the India–Pakistan relationship through the concepts of cumulative relative gains sensitivity, trade expectations and common projects, drawn from recent international relations theory literature, the paper argues that economic cooperation between the two depends on either prior security cooperation or, as a substitute, de facto deterrence. Nuclear deterrence now being a reality, the paper argues that, contrary to what may appear to be the case on the surface, the cumulative relative gains sensitivity of both sides, especially Pakistan, can now be reduced to enable economic cooperation that has the potential to create positive security spillovers.