IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT THROUGH THE ASSERTIVENESS OF FINANCIAL ANALYSTS’ FORECASTS

Abstract

Voluntary disclosure of financial accounting information aims to reduce the effects of agency relationship and informational asymmetry. Due to its non-mandatory character, such disclosure is subject to moral hazard, and may become a biased report of management performance. The Management Reports are presented as a space used by managers for voluntary disclosures, instructing the reading of the mandatory statements which they accompany. In this way, the reports become spaces where Impression Management can occur. Thus, the aim of this study was to analyze the relationship of Print Management in management communication with the quality of profit forecasts made by financial analysts of publicly-held companies enrolled in the Associação Brasileira das Companhias Abertas (ABRASCA) Award from 2016 to 2019 and that presented a message to shareholders in their Management Reports. Messages to shareholders were submitted to content analysis to determine the positive and/or negative character of the message phrases. The results obtained contribute to formulators and users of information by indicating that the assertiveness of analysts' forecasts for one year impacts voluntary disclosure in the message from management to shareholders for the following year. Thus, the manager's decision on "what" and "how" to report also takes into account factors external to the companies, using external sources to, in addition to reducing agency problems and informational asymmetry, practice Impression Management, making it clearer the information provided so that the market has an adequate perspective of future gains and losses.