Abstract
A central-local dual governance system is the basic system of environmental governance in China. Co-governance between the central environmental protection department (CEPD) and local environmental protection departments (LEPDs) is an important means to effectively promote China’s carbon emission reduction strategy. Accordingly, this paper discusses their interactive decision-making and investigates how to optimize the strategic relationships between the CEPD, LEPDs, and carbon emission enterprises (CEEs) under the dual governance system by constructing a trilateral evolutionary game model and analyzing evolutionary stability strategies, achieving a numerical experiment simulation of evolution processes and determining the impacts of various factors using MATLAB, leading to several countermeasures and suggestions. The results indicate that the CEPD should rationally use the incentive mechanism for LEPDs, improve the carbon tax system, and further penalize the nepotistic relationship of LEPDs and CEEs. Furthermore, it is essential to reform the current LEPD performance evaluation system and reduce the cost of LEPD positive regulation through subsidies and financial transfer payments. Additionally, the CEE strategy is affected by carbon reduction tax rates, penalties, subsides, and emission reduction costs and revenues. This study reveals the consequences of interactions between CEPD, LEPDs, and CEEs and presents options for the redesign of incentive and regulatory mechanisms to improve carbon emission reduction performance in China.
Highlights
In recent years, due to the frequent occurrence of extreme global weather disasters resulting from greenhouse gas emissions, governments of various countries have continued to vigorously promote and implement carbon emission reduction in various ways [1]
In the complex economic environment, it is difficult for the subjects involved in carbon emission reduction to remain completely rational, and their strategic choices will be affected by many factors, such as other game players and the external environment [51]
We analyzed promoting carbon emission enterprises (CEEs), local environmental protection departments (LEPDs), and central environmental protection department (CEPD) to form a sustainable regulation mode of carbon emission reduction, aiming aimingtotostudy study how effective parameter changes can accelerate the evolution of the reduction, how effective parameter changes can accelerate the evolution of the system system to the ideal state, the to the ideal state, the point
Summary
Due to the frequent occurrence of extreme global weather disasters resulting from greenhouse gas emissions, governments of various countries have continued to vigorously promote and implement carbon emission reduction in various ways [1]. The purpose of this study is to solve three main issues by analyzing the interactions and strategic option results of CEPD, LEPDs, and CEEs. First of all, this study attempts to reveal the mezzanine status of LEPDs as a bridge in the game model, linking the emission reduction decisions of enterprises with CEPD’s environmental regulations. This study attempts to reveal some specific factors and conditions that affect the tripartite system to reach the ideal state of CEPD inspection, local regulation, and enterprise emission reduction, and the evolutionary path to this ideal state and its impact on the rate of strategic convergence, aiming to provide economic means for the two levels of government to create a low-carbon economy. This study explains how to control regulatory costs, rewards and punishments, etc., to promote the realization of the ideal state of central government inspections, local government regulations, and carbon emission reduction for CEEs
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