Impeachment: A Mechanism between Political Accountability and Legal Responsibility? Common Law Sources and the Brazilian Originalist Model

Abstract

Abstract This paper seeks to analyze impeachment as a mechanism of institutional control of political actors, searching for its historical and theoretical bases in common law, so as to uncover the sources of the Brazilian originalist model. The Brazilian model deserves special attention due to its highly distinct, descriptive constitutional hypotheses. Before attempting to define the nature of impeachment, the main objective was to place the general idea of responsibility within the theoretical scope of representative democracy, accounting for potential failures resulting in frustration of expectations of constituencies and/or abuse of power by representatives. While identifying structural distinctions between political accountability and legal responsibility, it was appropriate to bring forth the requirement of legal violation in classical Athenian precedents (eisangeliai). In the end, this analysis goes over historical mutations of the impeachment mechanism: a) establishment of procedural parameters (British first cases); b) inceptive prerequisite of legal violation (Stuart period); c) attemptable specification of appropriate legal hypotheses (US); d) constitutional provision of precise categories of legal violation (Brazil).