Abstract

The tsunami of 26 December 2004 was the largest ever recorded in the Indian Ocean, triggered by the 3rd largest earthquake in 100 years measuring 9.2 moment magnitude. The epicenter of the earthquake was off Banda Aceh on the Indian Ocean coast of the island of Sumatra in Indonesia, centered at 3.316°N, 95.854°E. A sudden upward movement of the seafloor that averaged ∼6 m occurred along almost 1300 km of the north-east Indian Ocean plate at 0059 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) and lasted 8 min. Because of the lack of preparedness and absence of warning systems in the Indian Ocean the tsunami spread silently across the ocean over a span of 8 h causing massive destruction including the deaths of over 250,000 people, with maximum damages occurring in Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, India and the Maldives. Moderate to low damages were recorded in the Seychelles, Socotra (Yemen) and Somalia, though in the latter a highly vulnerable town was impacted resulting in over 300 deaths. Most of eastern Africa was spared massive damages from the waves due to (a) distance from the epicenter (>6000 km), (b) the dissipation of energy of the tsunami by shallow banks in the middle of the Indian Ocean (the Seychelles banks, Saya de Malha and Cargados Carajos Shoals) and (c) at least for Kenya and Tanzania, the first and largest waves hit at low tide. In Kenya and Tanzania these factors resulted in the waves being experienced as tidal surges of 1–1.5 m amplitude lasting 5–10 min. Damages recorded for eastern Africa include 11 deaths in Tanzania and 1 in Kenya, of people walking and swimming over shallow intertidal flats being trapped by the advancing and receding tidal surges, damage to boats anchored in shallow water and inundation in Mauritius and Rodrigues. Official information, warning and response networks were nonexistent, and even when an official response was generated in Kenya the public demonstrated no faith or willingness to act on warnings from officials such as the police. Importantly, information on the tsunami and the generation of an official response was dependent on two technologies, satellite television and mobile telephony, and these should be built into future warning systems as key mechanisms and backups to official information and warning networks.

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