Abstract

Shareholder activism refers to an active engagement of investors with the investee company and to influence its policies and strategies including the dividend policies. We have tried exploring the impact of shareholder activism on the dividend policies in India's banking sector. We have conducted panel data analysis using ordinary least square (OLS) methodology to understand how the dividend policies in India are impacted by activism. We also have used controlling variables such as return on asset, capital adequacy ratio, and provision coverage ratio in the model setup. The study was conducted on data of 34 Indian banks across four years (2016 – 2019). We have created a shareholder activism index that acts as a proxy for shareholder activism. As per panel data analysis, we found no significant impact of shareholder activism on corporate dividend policies. We also have tested the model for robustness and validated our findings. We have not found papers that study the connection between dividend policies and shareholder activism in the Indian context, but our findings are in line with similar literature available globally and in other emerging countries. We have a limited sample size of 34 banks to have data available for all the variables employed in the setup. Also, as shareholder activism is at a nascent stage in India, we found limited data around it. As per our review of literature, there is no similar study conducted in India. Instead of using different corporate governance (CG) variables, we have created a shareholder index that shows the involvement of shareholders in corporate governance activities. It covers an array of CG variables.

Highlights

  • In the current paper, we aim to understand the relationship between shareholder activism and dividend policies with special reference to the Indian banking sector

  • We found idle cash and capital structure as one of the important matters discussed in the literature and across the globe [70] and as per agency theory, dividend policies are means of reducing agency costs

  • As discussed in the result section, there is no significant impact of shareholders' activities on dividend policies of listed Indian banks

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Summary

Introduction

We aim to understand the relationship between shareholder activism and dividend policies with special reference to the Indian banking sector. As per Irrelevance theory, dividend policies do not affect the valuation of the firm [12,57] in the absence of taxes and transaction costs. Agency theory sees dividends as an agency cost-reducing mechanism [60,66]. Another set of literature on dividend policies studied the relationship between various firm-related factors such as institutional ownership [45], capital structure [64], free cash flows [75] on dividend policies. Agency costs arise from the three-tier structure of modern corporations [9]. Indian banks follow the three-tier corporate structure including public sector banks (PSB). We note that the dividend policies of banks are guided by regulations along with firm-level factors [61]

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