Abstract
This paper examines the impact of family firms' husband and wife shareholding on audit fees using family firms listed in A-share companies from 2002-2021 as a sample. The findings show that family firms' husband-wife shareholding significantly reduces audit fees. Further analysis shows that the effect of family firms' husband-wife shareholding on audit fees is more significant in companies with longer listing years and family firms with smaller losses. The mechanism test reveals that husband-wife shareholding in family firms leads to the misappropriation of funds by major shareholders and protects the truthfulness of the company's financial statements and business activities, which in turn reduces the audit fee. This study provides new ideas and empirical support for the role of husband-wife shareholding in corporate governance of family firms.
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