Abstract
This study challenges some interpretative strategies comparing Leibniz’s, or even Newton’s metaphysics of space to a Cartesian one. Not only did both Newton and Leibniz explicitly oppose Cartesian metaphysics as such, but neither of them had even the slightest intention of separating space from God, although they did not agree on the exact nature of such a space-God relationship. Moreover, it was just a conceptual disagreement, since the identification of space with an attribute of God is to be found not only by Leibniz but also by Newton, as well as by his defender Samuel Clarke. Neither diverge the reasons why Leibniz no more than Clarke eventually argued for the category of modification rather than an attribute.
Highlights
Fakticky přitom nesmírnost ani všudypřítomnost Boží nerozděluje jeho substanci na jednotlivé části o nic více, než trvání či kontinuita rozděluje na jednotlivé části jeho existenci,[102] což přitom v rámci dopisu pánovi z Gloucestershiru kvitoval rovněž Clarke.[103]
This study challenges some interpretative strategies comparing Leibniz’s, or even Newton’s metaphysics of space to a Cartesian one. Did both Newton and Leibniz explicitly oppose Cartesian metaphysics as such, but neither of them had even the slightest intention of separating space from God, they did not agree on the exact nature of such a space‐God relationship
Neither diverge the reasons why Leibniz no more than Clarke eventually argued for the category of modification rather than an attribute
Summary
Že, zatímco se podle Clarka jednalo o nutně existující Boží vlastnost, Leibniz jej považoval za pouhé relační ens rationis.[78] Vailati, stejně jako ani Risi, se nicméně rozhodně nemýlí v tom, že Clarke skutečně souhlasil s označením nekonečného prostoru za nesmírnost, avšak s výhradou, že nesmírnost není Bohem, a tudíž není Bohem ani nekonečný prostor.
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