Imago Dei and Simulatio or Imitatio Dei: A Philosophical Essay on Empathy

Abstract

Some advocates of the mirror neuron theory (MNT) argue that mirror neurons are necessary and sufficient to explain all types of mindreading of which empathy is seen as the core subject matter. Hence, the MNT is expected to be able to account for all kinds of empathic behavior. There is no need for analogical inference or theory of mind. To read another mind is to represent the perceptions, intentions, beliefs, expectations, and so on of the other. Due to mirror neuron activity, mindreading (and hence empathy) is automatic, immediate, unconscious and pre-reflective. I shall argue that mirror neuron activity may be sufficient to underpin primitive and involuntary types of empathic behavior but that mirror neurons are only to some extent involved in more developed, complex and consciousness related types of empathy such as what in the Jewish tradition is called doing mitzvah. Furthermore, I shall argue that in the process of mindreading the principle of analogical inference and the theory of mind cannot be entirely avoided.