Abstract
Committee chairs hold crucial positions in the legislative process and can push or quell legislative initiatives. While extant studies examine the formal powers and legislative consequences of committee chairs, we know less about their appointment. We examine who ruling parties (principal) appoint to committee chairs (agent) in order to minimize the risk of policy moving away from government positions. Using data from Japan (2003–2017) on the LDP, we test expectations derived from the principal‐agent framework, conditional on committee type. Japan makes an ideal case to study intraparty chair appointments due to its coalitions' office‐allocation patterns. We find that the party leadership appoints as chairs ideologically close MPs to committees with jurisdiction on high policy. However, we find no effect for chair appointments on particularistic committees. Using additional data on bill‐amendment rates, we emphasize the legislative consequences of political appointments in the legislative process.
Published Version
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