Abstract
AbstractWhile academics have examined how term limits affect elected officials, little work has gone into understanding the way they alter challenger behavior. I argue that they reduce the number of candidates who challenge incumbents, leading to a lock‐in effect. By increasing the frequency of open races, term limits incentivize potential challengers to wait for an open race. To demonstrate this, I analyze primary data from 85 legislative chambers in 44 states over a two‐decade period to see how term limits alter challenger entry patterns. I show that term‐limited incumbents face fewer challengers in their last two terms in office and challenges are weaker, while competition for open races ramps up. In doing so, I provide a major insight into how term limits alter challenger decision‐making to run for entry‐level office while improving our understanding of candidate entry by accounting for multiple potential points of entry.
Published Version
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