Abstract

Abstract : The Air Force has devoted significant energy, effort and financial resources to improve its force protection efforts since the June 1996 Khobar Towers attack. Despite these efforts, there remains room for additional improvement. The most visible aspect of force protection is physical security, and this area has received the most attention in Air Force force protection efforts. Physical security is important, but it does not override the role of force protection intelligence. In order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of our force protection efforts, we must be able to collect and analyze information on potential terrorists, saboteurs or other force protection threats in any location where Air Force resources and personnel operate. In this paper, I examine the role of intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) in force protection, and provide suggestions for improving the Air Force's ability to detect, analyze, and investigate force protection threats. I first suggest the Air Force must clarify the roles of Air Force Intelligence and CI in force protection, and produce comprehensive CI doctrine. Secondly, I discuss the need to increase the presence of Air Force CI personnel in major US cities and key foreign areas. I also offer proposals to increase the number of Air Force personnel engaged in CI collection activities. Finally, I discuss the need for the Air Force to clearly assign responsibility for the analysis of force protection intelligence, and develop force protection analytical cells at the Headquarters Air Force, major command, and numbered Air Force levels.

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