Abstract

Given the plethora of competing logical theories of validity available, it’s understandable that there has been a marked increase in interest in logical epistemology within the literature. If we are to choose between these logical theories, we require a good understanding of the suitable criteria we ought to judge according to. However, so far there’s been a lack of appreciation of how logical practice could support an epistemology of logic. This paper aims to correct that error, by arguing for a practice-based approach to logical epistemology. By looking at the types of evidence logicians actually appeal to in attempting to support their theories, we can provide a more detailed and realistic picture of logical epistemology. To demonstrate the fruitfulness of a practice-based approach, we look to a particular case of logical argumentation—the dialetheist’s arguments based upon the self-referential paradoxes—and show that the evidence appealed to support a particular theory of logical epistemology, logical abductivism.

Highlights

  • The last 50 years has been marked by a proliferation in the number of formal logical systems to serve a wide spectrum of technical and philosophical purposes

  • If we are to make a principled decision over which logic to endorse, we need an understanding of what constitutes logical evidence, which requires a theory of logical epistemology

  • We propose that by looking to logical practice we have both a means to find positive support for logical abductivism over competing theories of logical epistemology, and pinpoint the types of data that theories of logical consequence must accommodate

Read more

Summary

Motivating logical abductivism

The last 50 years has been marked by a proliferation in the number of formal logical systems to serve a wide spectrum of technical and philosophical purposes. Dynamic logics to model reasoning within mobile robots, temporal logics to model formal verification within systems, and annotated logics to model systems containing uncertainty. Sometimes this proliferation is epistemically unproblematic, as the logics are either proposed as being interesting in themselves, or seen to serve a distinct purpose from those of the other available logics. Several non-equivalent logics are considered as candidates to serve the same purpose. In such cases, we find ourselves engaged in theory choice

B Ben Martin
The state of play
Learning from practice
A case study: the dialetheism debate
Priest’s arguments for dialetheism
The liar paradoxes
The Russell paradox
Priest’s method of argument
Can rationalism or semanticism explain priest’s methodology?
Expanding the search
Conclusion
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call