Identification, recognition and misidentification syndromes: a psychoanalytical perspective

Abstract

Misidentification syndromes are currently often understood as cognitive disorders of either the “sense of uniqueness” (Margariti and Kontaxakis, 2006) or the recognition of people (Ellis and Lewis, 2001). It is however, necessary to consider how a normal “sense of uniqueness” or normal person recognition are acquired by normal or neurotic subjects. It will be shown here that the normal conditions of cognition can be considered as one of the possible forms of a complex structure and not as just a setting for our sense and perception data. The consistency and the permanency of the body image in neurosis is what permits the recognition of other people and ourselves as unique beings. This consistency and permanency are related to object repression, as shown by neurological disorders of body image (somatoparaphrenia), which cause the object to come to the foreground in the patient’s words (Thibierge and Morin, 2010). In misidentification syndromes, as in other psychotic syndromes, one can also observe damage to the specular image as well as an absence of object repression. This leads us to question whether, in the psychiatric disorders related to a damaged specular image, disorders of cognition can be studied and managed using the same methods as for neurotic patients.