Identification of risks of herdsmen's grassland transfer behavior in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia and a possible risk prevention mechanism.

Abstract

Effective identification of the risks of grassland circulation is an important prerequisite for improving the management of the grassland rental market. In this study, the potential risks in the game among the subjects of grassland transfer are analyzed through the lens of repeated game theory. With the help of interpretive structural modeling, we analyze the relationships and hierarchy among the risk factors in grassland circulation. We find that social, economic, and ecological risks are the main potential risks of grassland circulation, and there are strong correlations among risk factors. A risk hierarchy analysis shows that social risk is at the upper level, economic risk is at the middle level, ecological risk is at the bottom level, and there are cross-layer effects among the various risk levels. Contract risk, social security risk, and wealth gap risk are the core risk factors that trigger the risks associated with grassland transfer. Therefore, the first priority of the pasture manager (i.e., the government) should be to regulate the grassland circulation market and strengthen supervision and punishment of defaulting subjects. Second, a social security system in which the herdsmen and the government are both invested should be established. Third, the government should strengthen the construction of a "rule of law" system instead of "rule of man," to avoid the loss of government credibility caused by rent-seeking.