Abstract
A typical feature of English auctions and negotiated-price markets modeled as English auctions is that only the transaction price and identity of the winner are observed; auction entrants other than the winner are commonly not recorded in the data. Meanwhile, existing identification results for independent private values, including Athey and Haile (2002), require that the set of entrants be observed. This paper fills the gap by establishing nonparametric identification of asymmetric bidders’ value distributions when losing entrants are not observed, under a general class of entry models in which each potential entrant enters the auction with some bidder-specific probability.
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