Abstract
This paper considers an open outcry auction with a secret reserve price within the independent private-values paradigm. The theoretical model is mapped into an econometric specification and the distribution of private values is estimated. The objective is to quantify the seller's expected profit from moving to a mechanism where the reserve price is announced. Simulations indicate that the seller's revenue is about 10% higher if a reserve price is announced.
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