I Still Know What You Did Last Summer: Inferring Sensitive User Activities on Messaging Applications Through Traffic Analysis

Abstract

Instant Messaging (IM) applications such as Signal, Telegram, and WhatsApp have become tremendously popular in recent years. Unfortunately, such IM services have been targets of governmental surveillance and censorship, as these services are home to public and private communications on socially and politically sensitive topics. To protect their clients, popular IM services deploy state-of-the-art encryption. Despite the use of advanced encryption, we show that popular IM applications leak sensitive information about their clients to adversaries merely monitoring their encrypted IM traffic, with no need for leveraging any software vulnerabilities of IM applications. Specifically, we devise traffic analysis attacks enabling an adversary to identify participants of target IM communications (e.g., forums) with high accuracies. We believe that our study demonstrates a significant, real-world threat to the users of such services. <p xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">We demonstrate the practicality of our attacks through extensive experiments on real-world IM communications. We show that standard countermeasure techniques can degrade the effectiveness of these attacks. We hope our study will encourage IM providers to integrate effective traffic obfuscation into their software. In the meantime, we have designed a countermeasure system, called IMProxy that can be used by IM clients with no need for any support from IM providers. We demonstrate the effectiveness of IMProxy through simulation and experiments.