I, Robot have rights! Haven’t I? Conceptual and normative constraints on holding legal positions

Abstract

This paper investigates whether AI robots can hold legal rights, exploring both conceptual and justificatory aspects of the issue. It distinguishes between two types of inquiries: conceptual (whether robots can have rights) and normative (whether they should). It argues that interest theories are more suitable for addressing the latter, while will theories may seem more suitable to the former but are limited in reaching necessary truths about rights. Grounded in the idea that legal positions are constituted by legal norms, the paper examines the relationship between will as intentional action, investigating its implications for determining who can hold legal positions, and concludes that intentional action is necessary for legal positions involving action (e.g., duties, powers and liberties), while claim-rights or immunities can be conferred upon entities lacking this capacity. At the normative level, it explores reasons justifying the ascription of rights, focusing on the concept of interest. A suggested approach for the normative analysis required involves comparing robots’ interests with those of humans to justify their attribution of rights.