I. Kant and C.G. JunG on the ProsPeCts of sCIentIfIC PsyCholoGy

Valentin Balanovskiy

doi:10.36311/2318-0501.2017.v5n1.26.p375

Abstract

This study aims to show a similarity of Kant’s and Jung’s approaches to an issue of the possibility of scientific psychology, hence to explicate what they thought about the future of psychology. Therefore, the article contains heuristic material, which can contribute in a resolving of such methodological task as searching of promising directions to improve philosophical and scientific psychology.To achieve the aim the author attempts to clarify an entity of Kant’s and Jung’s objections against even the possibility of scientific psychology and to find out ways to overcome those objections in Kant’s and Jung’s works. The main methods were explication, reconstruction and comparative analysis of Kant’s and Jung’s views.As a result it was found, that Kant and Jung allocated one and the same obstacles, which, on their opinion, prevent psychology to become a science in the strict sense. They are: 1) coincidence of subject and object in psychology; 2) impossibility to apply quantitative mathematic methods in psychology; 3) pendency of the issue of psychophysical parallelism. However, Kant and Jung indicated ways to resolve formulated by them fundamental difficulties. All those ways lay through the searching a principle of interaction and connection between the psychic and the physical.

Highlights

As some researchers note (Wilber, 2000, p. viii), one of the most important stages in the formation of scientific psychology is the publication of G.T
The revolutionary character of Fechner’s ideas consisted in the fact that it was the first attempt to apply mathematical methods to examine such a complex and subtle matter as the human soul. In this way it was shown that a psyche can be an object of exact sciences, which methods formerly seemed to be suitable only for the studying of natural objects
After a brief analysis it seems obvious that both thinkers share the position, according to which psychology as a ‘proper’ science is impossible

Summary

Introduction

As some researchers note (Wilber, 2000, p. viii), one of the most important stages in the formation of scientific psychology is the publication of G.T. The revolutionary character of Fechner’s ideas consisted in the fact that it was the first attempt to apply mathematical methods to examine such a complex and subtle matter as the human soul. In this way it was shown that a psyche can be an object of exact sciences, which methods formerly seemed to be suitable only for the studying of natural objects. It should be noted that Kant’s objections have not any instrumental or historical character, as if someday through the improvement of measurement methods psychology could become a ‘proper’ science Instead, these objections have a fundamental nature. Despite his own achievements in scientific psychology, shared Kant’s views on the issue, he used somewhat different arguments

Objectives

Conclusion