Abstract

Property rights theory has contributed a great deal to global understanding of the factors shaping the management, governance and sustainability of discrete property regimes (individual, State, commons). Yet as the commons become increasingly altered and enclosed and management challenges extend beyond the boundaries of any given unit of property, institutional theory must extend beyond discrete property regimes. This paper argues that as natural resource management challenges grow more complex and interconnected, common property theory in the Ostrom tradition remains an essential component of successful management solutions – for common pool resources, public and private goods alike. Building on the commons and externality literature in general, and the Ostrom and Coasean traditions in particular, we propose the use of the term “hybrid institution” to explore the governance of common or connected interests within and between diverse property regimes. Following a general introduction to a set of propositions for encompassing this expanded realm of application of commons theory, we use the literature on integrated natural resource management to frame the scope of “commons” issues facing rural communities today. Empirical and action research from eastern Africa and logical arguments are each used to illustrate and sharpen the focus of our propositions so that they can be tested and refined in future research. This analysis demonstrates the instrumental potential of the concept of hybrid institutions as a framework for shaping more productive engagements with seemingly intractable natural resource management challenges at farm and landscape scale. Our analysis suggests that central elements of the Ostrom and Coasean traditions can be complementary explanatory lenses for contemporary resource conflict and management.

Highlights

  • The relative role of the state, individuals and collectivities in governing common pool resources has long been a subject of debate

  • This paper argues that as natural resource management challenges grow more complex and interconnected, common property theory in the Ostrom tradition remains an essential component of successful management solutions – for common pool resources, public and private goods alike

  • This paper introduces the concept of “hybrid institutions,” which we define as an institutional arrangement governing the interdependencies among discrete property holders and regimes, whether defined by structure or mode of governance

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Summary

Introduction

The relative role of the state, individuals and collectivities in governing common pool resources has long been a subject of debate. We argue that many contemporary natural resource management challenges do not fall within neatly inscribed units or categories of resource ownership or governance, but are characterized rather by their interdependencies. By their very nature, these challenges require collective solutions. We argue that a productive way forward lies on the interface between two areas of scholarship: the governance of common pool resources (Hardin 1968; Ostrom 1990) and the governance of externalities (Pigou 1932; Coase 1960) These scholars laid out detailed arguments in support of privatized vs collective governance of the commons, and for autonomous (free market or contract-based) vs hierarchical (state regulatory) governance of externalities. We finish with a discussion of the implications for natural resource scholarship and governance

Governing common property resources and externalities: past framing
Implications for property rights and institutional theory
What is governed?
Who governs?
How is it governed?
Testing propositions: empirical and logical arguments
Discussion
Conclusions
Literature cited
Full Text
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