Abstract
AbstractIn Part I, I established PCEJ and provided detailed accounts of the justification-conferring phenomenal characters of perceptual experiences and mathematical intuitions. In Part II, I will introduce the central elements of a Husserlian phenomenological-epistemological system and discuss how they fit with the findings of Part I. Thus, on the one hand, Part II has an interpretative objective: To present and systematize Husserl’s thoughts on epistemic justification. On the other hand, however, our investigations will be of systematic value. They will lead us to plausible, justified, and consistent approaches to foundationalism, rationalism, and epistemic internalism. In Chap. 9, I will provide a detailed account of Husserl’s conception of eidetic variation and eidetic intuition. These results of Part II will play an important role at the end of Part III when I clarify the benefits of Husserl’s version of a phenomenological internalism and show in which sense our phenomenological-epistemological system promises to be the most fundamental science. Our interpretative investigations in Part II will be very detailed with close attention to Husserl’s texts. This is because there exist a number of different and incompatible readings of Husserl, and, while I do not want to suggest that Husserl can only be interpreted in the way that I understand him, I wish to leave no doubt that Husserl can be read in a way that is friendly to my project and that such an interpretation makes sense not only for one particular period of Husserl’s thinking but for his overall oeuvre and phenomenological project.
Published Version
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