Hume’s Reply to Baylean Scepticism

Abstract

Commentators have long been aware of the pervasive influence of Pierre Bayle on Hume’s philosophical thought. In this paper I examine one facet of that influence: Hume’s somewhat surprising rejection of the sceptical methodology employed by Bayle throughout the Historical and Critical Dictionary and later works. For Bayle sceptical arguments take the form of antinomy in so far as the most certain and evident principles of human understanding are often found to be mutually inconsistent or even contradictory. After discussing several examples of these alleged conflicts, I take Bayle’s discussion of the composition of extension as my primary focus. While it is well known that Hume offers his account of space as a response to Bayle’s sceptical arguments in “Zeno of Elea,” commentators have taken less notice of Hume’s dogmatic rejection of the very possibility of Baylean style contradiction among our clear and distinct ideas. Careful examination of Hume’s discussion shows that however we may choose to characterize his brand of scepticism, he unequivocally rejects the radical scepticism championed by Bayle.