Abstract
This essay compares various attempts of interpreting Hume’s morality as a form of virtue ethics, focusing in particular on those ones recently made by some neo-Aristotelian philosophers. It considers Philippa Foot, Rosalind Hursthouse, Julia Annas, and Alasdair MacIntyre, and it maintains that they all misunderstand Hume as a virtue theorist. It also examines, and rejects, Christine Swanton’s response-dependent take on Hume. This essay offers an alternative understanding of Humean virtue ethics that depends on contingency, pluralism, and the mixed nature of human character. By doing this, it highlights the importance individuality plays in Humean virtue ethics as a value to be preserved and defended.
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