Hubris is the Handmaiden of Tragedy

Abstract

Perhaps it is good thing that present war in Iraq has gone so poorly for American-led coalition. At time of this writing-and sadly these numbers will seem outdated to reader-more than 1500 coalition soldiers have fallen in conflict. The number of Iraqi dead is beyond easily verifiable count. Every soldier killed or maimed pierces American psyche. Every civilian whose life is similarly shattered dims international hopes for stability in region long torn by strife. Critics of Bush administration's seemingly ill-fated Iraq policies surely should not wish for such strife and pain in order to prove their point, lest their callous disregard for life forever taint their wisdom and legacy.But history only pauses to mourn dead, it does not stop to linger. Thus it is left for us who remain to ponder if there is not perhaps sliver of silver lining to be found along difficult road to democracy in Iraq, because painless success might well have fostered within current administration readier use of force to solve subsequent international crises. Baghdad's conquest in 2003 was considered at time blueprint for new kind of forceful regime change. The Weekly Standard's William Kristol, intellectual godfather to war's neoconservative architects, termed Iraq the first great battle for future of Middle East, while Wall Street Journal's Max Boot warned jingoistically that rogue states from Tehran to Pyongyang could either embrace American leadership, or face a visit from 3rd infantry division.'Such plans were surely hindered by sacrifices demanded in pacifying occupied Iraq. American troops continue to die in nearly daily attacks two years after president declared an end to major combat operations. So too has visible affiliation with coalition forces proven deadly for innumerable Iraqis. The cost of an occupation that was supposed to pay for itself in oil revenues now easily exceeds $200 billion, and as for Boot's 3rd ID, which spearheaded assault on Baghdad in 2003: it is presently preparing to be first combat division to redeploy for second full tour in Iraq. Even in afterglow of relatively peaceful voting this past January, democratization has surely not proven to be cake-walk promised. Similarly too have triumvirate of focus-group tested rationales employed in 2003 as justification for deposing Saddam Hussein-weapons of mass destruction, liberation, and thwarting terrorism-proved illusory, making their use in future political campaigns problematic if not impossible. If Baghdad and Fallujah had trembled at mere presence of American troops, or if terrible weapons had been found and terrorism thwarted, current administration might have tried to reform another part of world through war, bludgeoning its few remaining critics at home through politics of fear. Whether subsequent ventures in empirebuilding would have proven successful none can say. What is certain is that more would have died in attempt, including perhaps Washington's remaining good-standing in world.The United States might indeed have lost far more in future campaigns than blood, treasure, and prestige already sacrificed in Iraq, because history is replete with leaders who repeated too frequently tactics that led to their initial successes. Tragedy is often their end, when overused tactics become stale or once narrowly defined strategies become too commonly employed. A list of defeats snatched from jaws of victory would have to include subject of this essay: tragic ends of practitioners of politics of fear who ultimately lose control over their own rambunctious rhetoric. It is testament to irony's role as universe's most powerful force that success often breeds hubris, handmaiden of tragedy.The Truman administration exemplifies this lesson. Its experience in forging domestic consensus for new brand of American internationalism in aftermath of national sacrifice thus has much to teach about ongoing war on terror. …