How to Improve the Supply of Quasi-Public Forest Infrastructure When Government Is the Leader: Evidence from Experimental Economics

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Forest infrastructure is an important material basis for healthy forests. According to public goods theory, most forest infrastructures are quasi-public goods, with demand exceeding supply, more than one supplier, unclear responsibilities between suppliers, and a resultant free-rider problem. This study explored ways to improve the supply of goods for forest infrastructure when the government—as leader—cooperates with foresters—as followers. Experimental economics were used to explain the factors that influence the behaviour of forest infrastructure quasi-public goods suppliers; to design twelve policy scenarios by communication, information feedback, rewards and punishments, and leadership styles; and to simulate the changes in foresters’ supply behaviour in different scenarios to analyse which policies were conducive to improving the supply of quasi-public forest infrastructures. The results were as follows: communication, rewards and punishments, information feedback, and leadership style reduce foresters’ free-riding behaviour; communication, rewards, and punishment increase supply, and, furthermore, the supply of the scenario with rewards and punishment is 1.792–4.616 times that of the situation without rewards and punishment; without the constraints of rewards and punishment, only feedback information reduces the supply; and the p values of the Mann–Whitney U test for the influence of leadership style on the supply level of forest infrastructure were all greater than 0.05, which indicates that no significant difference exists between leading by words and leading by example in supply improvement. When foresters are able to communicate with each other, reward and punishment exist, and information feedback is provided; hence, the supply of foresters is higher regardless of whether the government leads by words or by example. This study provided policy suggestions on how to improve the supply of quasi-public goods for forestry infrastructure, namely, that the organizer should organize foresters to fully negotiate before raising funds for infrastructure construction; publish, when appropriate, the supply and income of foresters; and formulate appropriate reward and punishment measures.