How to design fully cooperative policies to abate transboundary air pollution between two highly asymmetric regions: An abnormal incrementalism analysis

Abstract

Noncooperative policies for transboundary pollution abatement are inefficient and ineffective, but cooperative policies for pollution abatement are seldom successful in regions that have different development goals and conflicting interests. In this paper, by extracting the key components that lead to the success of pollution reduction policies between Hong Kong (HK) and Guangdong, we aim to construct a general framework for cooperative environmental management. The incentive for and the dynamic trajectory, core measures, and outcomes of cooperative pollution abatement policies to address transboundary air pollution were studied using incrementalism analysis. The context that drives the abnormal increment of cooperative policies between HK and Guangdong was analyzed to determine the factors that affect the full cooperation process. The political union between HK and China is the main driving force for fostering cooperative policies in these two regions that have highly asymmetric economic development levels and pollution emission intensities. The factors for successfully designing cooperative pollution reduction policies are revealed from trust building, political support, efficient governance, precise policies, a rational cost-sharing mechanism, and detailed management and implementation plans. Innovative multi-level and cross-department governance, and an unequal but rational cost-sharing scheme sustain long-term cooperation. A general framework is derived from these empirical key components and constructed as a systematic approach to provide a guide for designing cooperation in transboundary pollution reduction for the sustainable management of cross-border natural resources in different regions with conflicts of interest.