How to Compare Theories: Reference and Change

Abstract

Work at a decent level of generality is at an impasse today in the philosophy of science as well as in the history of science. The impasse separates the old philosophy of science (the positivists, and their sisters and their cousins and their aunts) over the issue of the comparability of scientific traditions from the new philosophy of science (Feyerabend, Hanson, Kuhn, Toulmin, et al.). I want here to display the source of the impasse in the theory of meaning, more especially in the theory of reference. I shall do this by examining a way with reference that looks like a promising way to attack the impasse. It turns out that although this way suggests a powerful critique of the new philosophy of science,, important insights of the new philosophy of science show as well the error of this way. I shall draw the obvious conclusion about reference from this situation and, finally, I shall try to set this conclusion in the context of a program for how to compare theories.'