How Open Lists Undermine the Electoral Support of Cohesive Parties

Thomas Bräuninger,Lukas Rudolph,Robert Huber,Thomas Däubler

doi:10.1017/s0007123421000417

Abstract

AbstractHow does ballot structure affect party choice? We argue that open lists undermine the electoral support of cohesive parties, to the benefit of internally divided parties. We conduct a survey-embedded experiment in the aftermath of the European migrant crisis, presenting German voters with real parties but fictitious politicians. A crossover design varies ballot type and exposure to candidate positions on immigration. We find that the internally divided Christian Democrats gain votes at the expense of the cohesive Alternative for Germany when open lists are used and candidate positions are known. For individuals who are equally attracted to both parties, switching is most likely if their immigration preferences lie near the midpoint between the two parties. Overall, our analysis establishes conditions under which ballot structure can affect the electoral performance of parties in general, and that of the populist right in particular.

Highlights

A large literature revolves around the contrast between voting for parties and voting for individual candidates, examining its consequences for voters, elites and the nature of representation
Their empirical evidence comes from a survey experiment in the UK, presenting respondents with a fictitious European Parliament election with four experimental groups that differ in the list type and information provision on candidate positions regarding Brexit
Results suggest that the British Conservative Party would, gain votes at the expense of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) under open rather than closed lists when information on candidate positions is given

Summary

Introduction

A large literature revolves around the contrast between voting for parties and voting for individual candidates, examining its consequences for voters, elites and the nature of representation (see, for example, Carey and Shugart 1995; Colomer 2011). The sets of ideal points that support a vote for one or another choice option are separated by a single point of indifference on the issue dimension.7 what is the effect of moving from a closed-list to an open-list system?

Results

Conclusion