Abstract

The severe economic downturn caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has forced governments worldwide to increase spending while tax revenues simultaneously collapsed. Concurrent with this, central banks in several of these countries are financing a significant percent of their direct income support through direct lending or purchases of government bonds in primary and/or secondary markets. Many oppose this for their alleged negative consequences on the economy, inflation in particular. This paper describes the actual workings of what most people (including many economists) often call monetization of government debt and its major implication, namely, that it leads to printing money and, consequently, to inflation. We show that the reality is very different: once one knows how modern central banks manage monetary policy (i.e., through a corridor interest rate targeting system), and how they coordinate their daily operations with their Treasuries, monetization does not occur as it is often described, and it is not nearly as dangerous as its critics argue (and not as useful as its supporters claim). The examples of the Philippines, Singapore, People’s Republic of China, and US clarify this.

Highlights

  • The severe economic downturn caused by the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has forced governments worldwide to increase spending as tax revenues simultaneously collapsed

  • Central banks (CBs) in several of these countries are financing a significant percent of this direct income support through direct lending or purchases of government bonds in primary and/or secondary markets

  • The ceiling for Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS)’s interest rate corridor, as well as the rate it pays on banks’ RBs as the corridor’s floor, are set daily at +0.5% and –0.5%, respectively, from the day’s market rate, rather than being policy variables for MAS

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

The severe economic downturn caused by the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has forced governments worldwide to increase spending as tax revenues simultaneously collapsed. According to the ADB COVID-19 Policy Database, CB financial support of government across all ADB members is $3,114 billion (plus nearly $400 billion more from the European Central Bank [ECB]), or 40% of the direct income support governments have authorized. Whereas standard thinking has been that CB support of government deficits amounts to “printing money” and/or “monetizing government debt,” actual operations and accounting show this not to be the case. We present three core points for understanding “monetization” from the operations and accounting in real world CBs. The subsequent four sections each deal with a significant part of the countries’ response to COVID-19 relevant to “monetization.” In the end, consistent with the use of quotes here around the term, “monetization” is not what most think it is. Without most even knowing it, it is already happening, even in normal times

CENTRAL BANK OPERATIONS AND GOVERNMENT DEBT
THE BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND FAILED TREASURY AUCTIONS IN MARCH
THE MONETARY AUTHORITY OF SINGAPORE AND THE GOVERNMENT’S DRAWDOWN OF RESERVES
MONETIZATION DEBATE IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE CARES ACT
CONCLUSIONS
Findings
28 References
Full Text
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