How Does Understanding of Social Situations and Other's Intention Contribute to Idiom and Irony Comprehension in Autism Spectrum Disorder?

The development of irony comprehension

Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is associated with deficient comprehension of figurative language and, specifically, idioms. Theories ascribe this to deficits in specific abilities (e.g., Theory of Mind [ToM]; executive functions [EF]; general language skills), but no comprehensive theory has resulted. This study investigated the differential contribution of various abilities to idiom comprehension among children and adolescents with ASD compared to matched controls with typical development (TD). The TD group outperformed the ASD group in idiom comprehension. However, whereas EF predicted idiom comprehension in the TD group, vocabulary predicted idiom comprehension in the ASD group. Our findings emphasize the link between general language competence and figurative language comprehension in ASD and point to different processing mechanisms in each group.

When researchers investigate figurative language abilities (including idioms) in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), syntax abilities may be more important than once considered. In addition, there are limitations to the overreliance on false-belief tasks to measure theory of mind (TOM) abilities. In the current study, the authors investigated idiom, syntax, and advanced TOM abilities in children with ASD compared to children with typical development (TD). Twenty-six children with ASD, ages 5 to 12 years, were compared to individuals in each of 2 control groups of children with TD: 1 matched on chronological age and nonverbal IQ, and 1 matched on syntax age-equivalence and raw scores. Idiom comprehension, syntax, vocabulary, and 2 measures of advanced TOM abilities were examined. Although children with ASD performed worse on idiom comprehension compared to the age-matched group with TD, they exhibited comparable idiom performance to the syntax-matched group with TD. Advanced TOM abilities were related to idiom comprehension for children with ASD, but not for children with TD, above the contributions of basic language abilities. Syntax abilities should be used as a matching variable when examining figurative or other late-developing language skills.

This study aimed to investigate the development of Theory of Mind (ToM) in children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), Down syndrome, and typical development from Iran and Sweden. Participants between the ages of 6 to 12 were assessed using various ToM tasks. Additionally, the study explored the correlation between children's behavioral problems, as reported by teachers and parents, and their ToM performance. Furthermore, the influence of family socioeconomic status on children's ToM understanding was examined. The research revealed that cultural factors played a partial role in specific ToM tasks during childhood, but not across the entire ToM construct in the studied groups. Introduction: Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to the ability to understand and attribute mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions, to oneself and others. It plays a crucial role in social interactions and is an essential aspect of cognitive development in children. This study aimed to explore the influence of cultural factors on ToM development in children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), Down syndrome, and typical development. Methodology: The participants consisted of 74 native speakers from Iran and 66 from Sweden, falling within the 6 to 12 age range. They were divided into three groups based on their developmental profiles: children with ASD, children with Down syndrome, and typically developing children. ToM tasks were administered to measure their ToM abilities across all orders of complexity. Results: The study found that cultural factors partially influenced specific ToM tasks that children developed during their childhood. However, this effect was not observed across the entire ToM construct for any of the studied groups. The findings suggest that cultural differences might impact certain aspects of ToM development, but they do not have a universal effect on ToM understanding in the studied populations. The results also revealed a strong correlation between children's behavioral problems, as reported by teachers, and their ToM performance. However, this correlation was not significant when considering parents' perspectives. This discrepancy highlights the importance of considering multiple informants when assessing children's behavior and social cognition. Furthermore, the study examined the relationship between family socioeconomic status and children's ToM understanding. Surprisingly, no clear link was found in any of the studied groups, suggesting that socioeconomic status may not be a determining factor in ToM development among these children. Conclusion: In conclusion, this cross-cultural analysis provides valuable insights into the development of ToM in children with Autism Spectrum Disorder, Down syndrome, and typical development from Iran and Sweden. Cultural factors were found to have a partial influence on specific ToM tasks developed during childhood, while family socioeconomic status did not appear to be significantly linked to ToM understanding in these groups. The study also underscores the importance of considering different perspectives when evaluating children's behavior and social cognition. Further research is warranted to explore other potential factors that may impact ToM development in diverse populations.

First-order theory of mind (ToM) is necessary for comprehension of metaphors, and second-order ToM is necessary for comprehension of irony. This study investigated the role of ToM and language ability in comprehending figurative language in 50 Taiwanese children with high-functioning autism spectrum disorders (HFASDs) compared with 50 typically developing children. Results showed that the No-ToM HFASDs group performed worse than the first-order ToM HFASDs group and the second-order ToM HFASDs group in comprehension of metaphors, irony, sarcasm and indirect reproach, but not for indirect request. Receptive vocabulary correlated only with metaphor comprehension. The volatility of results seen among studies in terms of the relationship between ToM and figurative language comprehension is discussed.

Children with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) have some shortcomings in the understanding of irony. It’s mainly from the prosody, a kind of language cue, to study the understanding of irony. However, Chinese-speaking children with ASD are less capable of using prosodic cues for irony comprehension, and sentence-final particles (SFPs) may be used for this pragmatic function. This study used three measurement indicators (the attitude, intention and language explanation) to examine the effects of the SFPs on the comprehension of different types of irony between the High-functioning Autism Spectrum Disorder (HFASD) and the Typical Development (TD) children group. The study found there was a significant difference on the irony comprehension between two groups. Language cues SFPs can only play a role in the irony which HFASD children can make the understanding and judgment by. And for TD children, the SFP made a significant effect on the irony of compliment. It shows that two groups used different treatment strategies to understand the irony. The differences were discussed by the theory of mind, the frequency of utterance and the rule of cognition.

In this case report, we studied Theory of Mind (ToM) and figurative language comprehension in a 7.2-year-old child, conventionally named RJ, with isolated and complete agenesis of the corpus callosum (ACC), a rare malformation due to the absence of the corpus callosum, the major tract connecting the two brain hemispheres. To study ToM, which is the capability to infer the other’s mental states, we used the classical false belief tasks, and to study figurative language, i.e., those linguistic usages involving non-literal meanings, we used tasks assessing metaphor and idiom comprehension. RJ’s intellectual level and his phonological, lexical, and grammatical abilities were all adequate. In both the ToM false belief tasks and novel sensory metaphor comprehension, RJ showed a delay of 3 years and a significant gap compared to a typically developing control group, while in idioms, his performance was at the border of average. These outcomes suggest that RJ has a specific pragmatic difficulty in all tasks where he must interpret the other’s communicative intention, as in ToM tasks and novel sensory metaphor comprehension. The outcomes also open up interesting insights into the relationships between ToM and figurative language in children with isolated and complete ACC.

In This Issue

Unlike their English-speaking counterparts, Japanese children with high-functioning autism spectrum disorders (HFASDs) perform as well as typically developing (TD) children in comprehending metaphor, despite lacking 1st order theory of mind (ToM) reasoning. Additionally, although Japanese sarcasm and “indirect reproach” appear theoretically to need 2nd order ToM reasoning, HFASD children without this comprehended these forms of language as well as TD children. To attempt to explain this contradiction, we asked college freshmen to evaluate the strangeness (unconventionality) of these types of figurative language. We aimed to test the hypothesis that metaphor, sarcasm, and “indirect reproach” might be evaluated as more conventional than irony, which children with HFASDs do not comprehend as well as those with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. The results for irony, metaphor, and “indirect reproach” supported the hypothesis, while those for sarcasm did not. Sarcasm is comprehended by HFASDs children as well as by TD children despite being evaluated as highly unconventional. This contradiction is discussed from a self-in-relation-to-other perspective. We postulate that a new explanation of disabilities of figurative language comprehension in children with HFASDs is needed instead of relying on a single cognitive process.

Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) are neurodevelopmental disorders characterized by social impairments. The first objective of this study was to analyze social cognition deficits of children with ADHD, high-functioning ASD (HFASD), and typical development (TD) in their performance on explicit and applied measures of theory of mind (ToM). The second objective was to investigate the relationships between executive functions and social cognition in HFASD and ADHD. One hundred and twenty-six 7- to 11-year old children, 52 with HFASD, 35 with ADHD, and 39 with TD, performed the NEPSY-II social perception subtests. Parents estimated their children's ToM skills using the Theory of Mind Inventory (ToMI). Teacher-reported data from the Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function (BRIEF) were also obtained. The HFASD and ADHD groups showed worse performance on the verbal ToM task than the TD group, and only the performance of the HFASD group was significantly lower than the TD group on the contextual ToM task. Parents also estimated that the HFASD group had more difficulties on the applied ToM than the ADHD and TD groups. Furthermore, there is a different executive function-theory of mind link in the HFASD and ADHD groups: behavioral regulation processes such as inhibition and emotional control are more associated with social cognition in children with ADHD, whereas metacognitive processes such as initiation and planning have a strong association with social cognition in children with HFASD. These findings have implications for understanding social perception deficits in neurodevelopmental disorders, highlighting the need for early intervention.

The developmental trajectories of Theory of Mind (ToM) in later childhood and into adolescence have not been thoroughly investigated, partly due to a lack of sensitive paradigms that can chart development in typical populations or in individuals with a core deficit in ToM, such as those with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). The present study assessed understanding of emotions, beliefs, and intentions using both an established ToM task () and the more recently developed Comic Strip Task (CST; ). Participants comprised 12 typically-developing (TD) children (mean age: 12·0 years, range: 9·9–14·8 years) and 12 high-functioning children with ASD (mean age: 11·0 years, range: 9·1–13·6 years). Results indicated that the ASD group were not impaired on any of the ToM tasks relative to TD children. It was concluded that although children with high-functioning ASD appear to develop basic ToM skills, they do not generalize these to naturalistic situations. The comic-strip paradigm is suggested as a promising way to approach the measurement of ToM across childhood in typical children and those with ASD.

Pragmatic language impairments are nearly universal in autism spectrum disorders (ASD). Discourse requires that we monitor information that is shared or mutually known, called "common ground." While many studies have examined the role of Theory of Mind (ToM) in such impairments, few have examined working memory (WM). Common ground impairments in ASD could reflect limitations in both WM and ToM. This study explored common ground use in youth ages 8-17 years with high-functioning ASD (n = 13) and typical development (n = 22); groups did not differ on age, gender, IQ, or standardized language. We tracked participants' eye movements while they performed a discourse task in which some information was known only to the participant (e.g., was privileged; a manipulation of ToM). In addition, the amount of privileged information varied (a manipulation of WM). All participants were slower to fixate the target when considering privileged information, and this effect was greatest during high WM load trials. Further, the ASD group was more likely to fixate competing (non-target) shapes. Predictors of fixation patterns included ASD symptomatology, language ability, ToM, and WM. Groups did not differ in ToM. Individuals with better WM fixated the target more rapidly, suggesting an association between WM capacity and efficient discourse. In addition to ToM knowledge, WM capacity constrains common ground representation and impacts pragmatic skills in ASD. Social impairments in ASD are thus associated with WM capacity, such that deficits in domain-general, nonsocial processes such as WM exert an influence during complex social interactions. Autism Res 2016, 9: 1340-1352. © 2016 International Society for Autism Research, Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Behavioral and Neural Evidence on Pragmatic Processing: A Foreword to XPRAG.it

Semantic jokes involve resolving an incongruity emerging from wordplay or from a violation of world knowledge. The research has shown individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) demonstrate a lower performance on humor tasks involving social situations; however, less is known about their semantic joke comprehension. This study examines semantic joke comprehension among adolescents with ASD and its possible relationship to vocabulary size, theory of mind (ToM), and idiom comprehension. Thirty-two adolescents with ASD and 32 typically developed (TD) peers participated. Semantic joke comprehension was assessed via a multiple-choice questionnaire and time-limited computer program. Vocabulary, ToM abilities, and idiom comprehension were also tested. The results reveal that adolescents with ASD are as fast in processing semantic jokes as their age- and vocabulary-matched TD peers, but less accurate. Age and idiom comprehension significantly contributed to semantic joke comprehension among both groups. As semantic joke comprehension is based on incongruity resolution, the greater difficulties in comprehension among the adolescents with ASD may have been due to deficits in simultaneously retaining two alternative interpretations and selecting the relevant one (and not due reduced ToM abilities). Similar to the TD group, semantic joke comprehension among the ASD group appeared to be more developed with age.

Impairments in the broader domain of pragmatics are considered to be a defining feature of Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). A challenging aspect of pragmatic competence is the ability to process nonliteral language. Interestingly, previous studies in figurative language comprehension in ASD have demonstrated conflicting results regarding participants' performance. The main scientific debate focuses on the underlying skills which facilitate processing of nonliteral speech in ASD. Namely, Theory of Mind (ToM), language abilities and Executive functions (EFs) are regarded as factors affecting autistic individuals' performance. This review addresses figurative language comprehension in ASD in light of the above three interpretive accounts. We reviewed data from recent studies in this field concluding that autistic children indeed encounter systematic difficulties in the processing of non-literal language. Moreover, only ToM and verbal skills were found to correlate the most with figurative language comprehension in ASD. Notably, we found that differences related to research methodology and tasks' properties may have led to discrepancies between studies' results. Finally, we argue that future studies should encompass in their experimental design figurative comprehension tasks with minimal linguistic demands and also measures of ToM, verbal ability and EFs in order to shed more light in the independent contribution of those skills to the processing of nonliteral language in ASD.