How Do States Renegotiate International Institutions? Japan’s Renegotiation Diplomacy Since World War II

Abstract

AbstractHow do states renegotiate their status in international organizations? I evaluate two hypotheses about renegotiation strategy choice. The first hypothesis conceptualizes renegotiation strategies as intertwined with challenger state objectives: reformist states will opt for integrative strategies – principled persuasion or strategic cooptation – while revisionist states will pursue distributive strategies – power bargaining or rhetorical coercion. The second hypothesis assumes states choose renegotiation strategies instrumentally, combining integrative and distributive strategies to maximize the likelihood of a successful alteration of the status quo. I evaluate the hypotheses by examining Japan, a country that has pursued renegotiation diplomacy across many institutional contexts. The case study evidence broadly favors the instrumental hypothesis: despite reformist objectives, Japan has often used power bargaining in tandem with integrative strategies. Contrary to the first hypothesis, Japanese objectives have not been clearly intertwined with renegotiation strategy choice. I further argue that future research should examine domestic political determinants of strategy choice, which have been important in the evolution of Japanese renegotiation diplomacy.