Abstract
ABSTRACT In ‘strong mayor’ local government systems, the institutional rules often allow for the formation of divided government. When the local government is divided, i.e. mayor is not supported by the majority in the council, the dominance of the mayor in horizontal power relations may be undermined. This paper studies local budgetary resolutions and annual discharge resolutions in Poland, where the electoral system affects the formation of divided government. The analyses presents that: the budget is adopted later and the discharge resolution is more often not adopted in the first vote in municipalities with divided government than in those with unified.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
