How can governance strategies be developed for marine ecological environment pollution caused by sea-using enterprises? — A study based on evolutionary game theory

Abstract

The governance of marine ecological environmental pollution is not only the responsibility of the central government (CG) but also requires the cooperation of multiple stakeholders, such as local governments (LGs) and sea-using enterprises (SEs). Using marine ecological environment pollution governance in coastal areas as the research object, this paper establishes a three-party evolutionary game model and analyzes the interests and preferences of stakeholders to demonstrate how CG affects the strategic choice of LGs and SEs by formulating marine pollution control policies, such as marine ecological damage compensation and performance appraisal. On this basis, using numerical simulation technology, a numerical simulation analysis is conducted by introducing policy indicators, including performance appraisal criteria for LGs, the amount of marine ecological damage compensation and penalties. The results show that without the implementation of strict marine ecological environment governance policies, stakeholders will fall into the prisoner dilemma of “irregular partial supervision by CG, partial implementation by LGs and partial compliance by SEs”. However, the incentive compatibility among the CG, LGs and SEs can be realized by increasing the proportion of ecological environment performance appraisal of LGs, levying marine ecological damage compensation for SEs and penalties for both stakeholders. In that case, LGs and SEs will also implement marine ecological environment protection and governance strategies even if the CG chooses a loose supervision strategy. On this basis, related policy implications are finally proposed, which can improve the efficiency of the governance of the marine ecological damage and environmental pollution caused by SEs and realize the sustainable development of the marine economy.