Abstract
In this paper, we demonstrate how a systematic taxonomy of stances can help elucidate two classic debates of the historical turn—the Lakatos–Feyerabend debate concerning theory rejection and the Feyerabend–Kuhn debate about pluralism during normal science. We contend that Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Lakatos were often talking at cross-purposes due to the lack of an agreed upon taxonomy of stances. Specifically, we provide three distinct stances that scientists take towards theories: acceptance of a theory as the best available description of its domain, use of a theory in practical applications, and pursuit (elaboration) of a theory. We argue that in the Lakatos–Feyerabend debate, Lakatos was concerned with acceptance whereas Feyerabend was mainly concerned with pursuit. Additionally, we show how Feyerabend and Kuhn’s debate on the role of pluralism/monism in normal science involved a crucial conflation of all three stances. Finally, we outline a few general lessons concerning the process of scientific change.
Highlights
In this paper, we demonstrate how a systematic taxonomy of stances can help elucidate two classic debates of the historical turn—the Lakatos–Feyerabend debate concerning theory rejection and the Feyerabend–Kuhn debate about pluralism during normal science
We contend that these debates were not properly resolved partly because Feyerabend, Kuhn, and Lakatos conflated distinct stances that scientists can take towards theories
It is important to distinguish between acceptance, use, and pursuit as distinct stances that a community or an individual scientist can take towards a theory
Summary
The historical turn was one of the most exciting periods of 20th century philosophy of science. This excitement was largely generated by Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which prompted intense debates about the foundations of scientific rationality, the importance of the history of science to philosophy of science, and the conception of philosophy of science itself. We contend that these debates were not properly resolved partly because Feyerabend, Kuhn, and Lakatos conflated distinct stances that scientists can take towards theories. By providing a taxonomy of stances, we show how these debates could have been resolved. We provide a motivation for a well-defined taxonomy of stances. We conclude by drawing three important lessons on how science changes through time
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