Abstract
This paper provides a critical evaluation of Friedman’s arguments in favour of a relativized a priori resting on Cassirer’s Neo-Kantianism, Reichenbach’s and Carnap’s constitutive a priori, and finally Kuhn’s account of scientific paradigms change. The main objection concerns Cassirer’s own view of dynamic and historical moveable a priori categories, which Friedman seems to underestimate and recasts in a merely regulative function. However, Cassirer conception of a “liberalized” a priori can shed new light on the process of scientific change and his transcendental method may be considered as a still stimulating alternative to Kuhn’s and post-Kuhnian relativism in the philosophy of science.
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