How and Why Animals Matter

Abstract

Some years ago, the philosopher Mary Midgley wrote Animals and Why They Matter (Midgley 1983). The book speaks for itself eloquently; and despite much philosophic, theological, and ethical exploration of humans' relations to and use of animals in laboratory research and elsewhere, the central question remains: Why do animals matter? The question remains fundamentally important because we humans and the character and goodness of our lives are centrally implicated. Our attitude toward animals and wider animate life says much about who we are and about our basic human and moral stance toward the world. Moral concerns for animals in laboratory research settings are not new. Fundamental moral issues of pain, suffering, distress, death, and respect have long been recognized by animal care and use committees and researchers who have acknowledged the importance of guidelines for laboratory animal care (Donnelley and Nolan 1990; NRC 1992). Yet our basic attitudes and moral stances toward animals remain a crucial and ongoing issue, for these motivate our behavior and concern toward animals—how we follow guidelines and what standards are used. I believe it is appropriate to reopen the issue of how and why animals matter and ask again: Is it possible to agree on an overall framework of thought or world view to orient ourselves and help guide our moral decision making on animal use with respect to institutional policies and individual research protocols?